Chicago-Kent Law Review
Volume 78
Issue 1 Symposium: Private Law, Punishment,
and Disgorgement

Article 2

April 2003

What Does It Mean to Say That a Remedy Punishes: Introduction
Anthony J. Sebok

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Anthony J. Sebok, What Does It Mean to Say That a Remedy Punishes: Introduction, 78 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 3
(2003).
Available at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview/vol78/iss1/2

This Front Matter is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of
Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Chicago-Kent Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons
@ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. For more information, please contact jwenger@kentlaw.iit.edu,
ebarney@kentlaw.iit.edu.

INTRODUCTION: WHAT DOES IT MEAN TO SAY THAT A
REMEDY PUNISHES?
ANTHONY J. SEBOK, SYMPOSIUM EDITOR*

I.

A FAMILIAR DICHOTOMY AND TWO QUESTIONS

The idea that private law remedies are compensatory and not
punitive may be as old as the distinction between public and private
law. In his Commentaries, Blackstone not only claimed his nowfamous distinction between public and private wrong, he also drew a
connection between remedy and wrong. Private law remedies
violations of private right through redress "by either restoring to [the
victim] his right" or providing him compensation) Criminal law does
not restore anyone's rights; it secures a "benefit to the public"
2
through punishment and prevention.
Of course, Blackstone recognized that the same wrongful act
could be both a public and a private wrong. 3 Theft is a wrong that
hurts the person dispossessed of her property by denying her a civil
right, and it is also an injury to "the whole community" because it is a
breach of public right.4 What Blackstone urged was that the purpose
and structure of the response to each rights violation be complementary and mutually exclusive: redress for the former and penal sanction
for the latter.
The structure proposed by Blackstone can be criticized on many
levels. One could point out, as Holmes did, that early precursors of
the common law mixed redress and sanction freely. In Lecture I of
The Common Law, Holmes noted that in Anglo-Saxon law, the
winner of an action for damages could seize and destroy the animal or
inanimate object which was the immediate cause of the injury suffered in order to "punish" the losing party, and in Roman law con*
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tract breach was sometimes remedied through personally delivering
the breacher to the aggrieved creditor., From this he concluded that
early property, contract, and tort law was characterized by a desire for
vengeance.
One could argue, as modern law and economics scholars do, that
the redressive function of private law and the sanction function of
criminal law should have the same purpose: to deter inefficient
conduct ex ante and thereby maximize social welfare. 6 Or one could
argue, in the tradition of progressive and critical legal scholarship,
that the redressive remedies of private law are coextensive with the
sanctions imposed through public law, in that both public and private
law ultimately serve to promote and preserve the interests of a subset
of society (usually capital).'
And yet the generalization that private law compensates and
does not punish persists. At the same time, even legal novices learn
quickly that the generalization has exceptions, either built directly
into the law (such as punitive damages), or into its results (such as
disgorgement). This symposium seeks to understand how these
exceptions fit into Blackstone's general scheme. Its goals are twofold.
First, to locate episodes in private law where punishment, not compensation, seems to predominate the remedies structure. Second, to
develop theories concerning where such episodes occur and, where
possible, explain why.
The essays in this volume range over a heterogeneous collection
of doctrinal fields. Three authors have written on contract law; three
authors have written about torts; one author has written about
remedies; and another author has written about private antitrust
actions. The authors approach the issue of punishment from a
diversity of theoretical perspectives as well: some of the authors
clearly favor law and economics and its formal methodology, others
work out of the more philosophically-oriented perspective of corrective justice, while yet others adopt a more pragmatic approach,
examining doctrine against a test of legal coherence.
Two further sets of differences divide the authors. First, since
punishment itself is a heterogeneous concept, different authors could
5.
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have found (or have looked for) different senses of the concept in
their chosen area of inquiry. Punishment can have a number of
justifications, of which deterrence and retribution are but two of the
most inclusive kinds. 8 It should not be surprising, therefore, that
many of the authors, if they found punishment, found that it injected
either a deterrent or retributive element into the area of law they
examined. It is clear, for example, that Aaron Edlin and Alan
Schwartz see a large role for deterrence in contract damages, while
Andrew Kull recognizes a retributive theme in restitution.
Second, some, but not all, of the authors stated or implied that
the injection of punishment (in either of its senses) into the private
law is either a good or a bad thing. Ernest Weinrib clearly thinks that
punishment can never properly be part of contract damages, while
Volker Behr argues that the recent growth of punishment-like
damages in German law is a healthy development that should be
encouraged.
Taking these two sets of value judgments as axes, I will briefly
set out how each article grapples with the questions of what sort of
punishment is to be found in private law (if any), and whether punishment's presence in private law (or at least a corner of private law)
is a matter of regret or celebration.
II. THE ARTICLES AND THE TWO QUESTIONS REVISITED
Andrew Kull's article, Restitution's Outlaws, makes the uneasy
case for recognizing punishment in the law of unjust enrichment. As
Kull notes, it is taken to be "axiomatic" that restitution is not supposed to be punitive. 9 However, Kull, who is the Reporter for the
Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment, notes
that one cannot simply ignore that restitution is sometimes withheld
from a litigant on the grounds that "by their bad conduct, [they] have
forfeited their right to the court's assistance." 10 Kull calls this restitution's "negative sanction.""
The title of Kull's article may be viewed as a double pun. The
law itself could be viewed as acting like a doctrinal "outlaw" (or
vigilante) when it imposes a negative sanction, since it is supposed to
8. See
OF LAW
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do no more than return parties to their ex ante positions. On the
other hand,and this is more likely what Kull has in mind, the law of
restitution imposes negative sanctions on equity's "outlaws" -that is,
persons who have otherwise meritorious claims and who have acted
in some way that deserves social sanction. Kull details two ways in
which restitution imposes its negative sanction. The first way involves
episodes of "unclean hands. ' 12 The second way involves episodes in
which the defendants do not merely disgorge their wrongful gains but
13
are forced to forfeit all their gains.
Kull concludes by observing that the negative sanction in restitution is obscured by the way in which we classify restitutionary remedies and their function. He suggests at the end of the article that the
function the negative sanction serves is retributive.1 4 Thus, Kull's
article offers the following answers to the questions which frame this
volume. In unjust enrichment, at least, punishment serves a retributive function, and it is an intrinsic and integral part of the law as it
now stands. Kull gives no indication that he thinks of punishment in
restitution as an "outlaw" in any way that should alarm us. If anything, Kull seems to be suggesting that his identification of the
negative sanction in restitution should make us rethink the axioms
with which we characterize the law.
Aaron Edlin and Alan Schwartz's article, Optimal Penalties in
Contracts, also embraces punishment in the area of private law in
which they specialize. Edlin and Schwartz note that currently, the law
prohibits liquidated damages which are greater than the ex ante
estimation of the promisee's expectation interest. 5 These are called
penalties for nonperformance, a characterization which Edlin and
Schwartz accept. What Edlin and Schwartz reject is the categorical
rejection of liquidated damages which are penalties.
Obviously, Edlin and Schwartz think that a contract penalty
should be understood simply as the price necessary to achieve social
efficiency.1 6 Contract penalties should not be retributive but should
serve pure deterrence goals. They recognize that in the real world,
any given liquidated damages clause could be used tactically by either

12.
13.
14.
15.
REV. 33
16.

Id. at 23-24.
Id. at 27-29.
Id. at 30.
Aaron S. Edlin & Alan Schwartz, Optimal Penalties in Contracts, 78 CHI.-KENT L.
(2003).
Id. at 36-37.
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a buyer or a seller to achieve gains inconsistent with society's interest
in maximal utility. 7 They note, for example, that liquidated damages
may be inefficient when the multiplier is less than 1.0, equal to 1.0, or
greater than 1.0. Their point, however, is that there is no a priori
reason for the courts to treat liquidated damages clauses where the
multiplier is greater than 1.0 differently than when it is 1.0 or less than
1.0.18 By way of example, Edlin and Schwartz illustrate why, when
either or both of the contracting parties can choose to invest in the
performance of the contract, it may be efficient to allow the investing
party to demand a penalty from the breacher that is greater than 1.0. 9
Edlin and Schwartz conclude that since courts are in a very bad
position to discriminate among liquidated damages clauses on the
basis of their efficiency, they should allow all such clauses as long as
they have not been formed under the conditions of unconscionability. 20 This rule would remove the stigma currently borne by contract
penalties. Edlin and Schwartz thus believe that punishment clearly
should be part of contract law, but only if by punishment one means
self-imposed penalties designed to deter future selves from engaging
in inefficient conduct. Thus, it is clear that they believe that penalties-as defined presently by the courts-are a good thing that ought
to be rescued from their current state of disfavor. I
Kull's and Edlin and Schwartz's certitude meets its match in
Ernest Weinrib's article, Punishment and Disgorgement as Contract
Remedies. Although it is specifically about contract law, Weinrib, a
preeminent spokesperson and advocate for corrective justice in
private law, makes an argument that is broad enough to suggest a
rebuttal to Kull's article as well.
Weinrib notes that in Canada, England, and Israel, recent decisions have shown a softening of the law towards permitting a punitive
function in disgorgement and contract damages. 2' He sees this as a
disturbing trend, especially in the area of contract law. Because
Weinrib writes from the perspective of corrective justice, his main
concern is that the remedies imposed in private law should "undo the
injustice between the parties. ' 22 This not only categorically excludes
17. Id. at 39.
18. Id. at 52-53.
19. Id. at 45.
20. Id. at 52-54.
21. Ernest J. Weinrib, Punishmentand Disgorementas ConractRemedies, 78 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 55, 55 n.1 (citing Whiten, Blake, & Adras).
22. Id. at 60.
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instrumental justifications, such as deterrence, but it also puts a very
demanding burden of proof on punishment rationales rooted in
retribution.
Weinrib argues that corrective justice should look to Kant to explain the remedy which contract law should prescribe. He notes that
Kant "establishes contractual performance as the possible content of
a right," and the conditions of a contract's formation determines
whether the contract's performance may be demanded by the
rightholder.23 Under this approach, in the event of a contract breach,
the plaintiff's wrong is the defendant's repudiation of the plaintiff's
right to performance. It is not the value of the performance-that
thing which, since Fuller and Perdue's famous article, has been called
the "expectancy interest. '24
Weinrib recognizes that since specific performance is rarely
awarded in common law contract, expectancy damages serve as a
proxy for the damages resulting from the violation of the right to
performance.25 But for Weinrib, failing to understand the distinction
between viewing expectancy damages as an artifact and the right to
performance as the original can have dangerous consequences. He
argues that the Fuller-Perdue approach to expectancy damages,
which is to view them as flexible instruments of social policy, opens
the door to punitive damages in contract law. He thus sees Whiten v.
Pilot Insurance, a recent decision by the Supreme Court of Canada,
which allowed an insured to collect noncompensatory damages from
her insurer as a product of a court's failure to understand the corrective justice foundations of contract damages.
Similarly, Weinrib looks at what he calls "miscellaneous instances of gain-based recovery" in the common law and asks whether
they represent a new "general conception" of disgorgement. 26 While
the instances identified by Weinrib are not exactly the same as those
identified by Kull, the phenomenon identified by each overlaps.
Weinrib is interested in cases of contract breach where the plaintiff's
loss is measured by the defendant's gain, such as where defective
performance by the promisor saves him money without causing the
promisee further loss. As Weinrib points out, echoing Kull, the basis
for disgorgement in these cases is that one should not profit from
23.
24.
25.
26.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

66.
67-68. See the discussion of Fuller & Perdue at pp. 62-64.
69-70.
72.
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one's own wrong. 27 Weinrib's criticism of this explanation is that it
cannot satisfy the corrective justice test for the right remedy. Under
corrective justice, the plaintiff needs to show more than an "historical" connection between the defendant's breach of the plaintiff's right
and the defendant's gain; she must show a "normative connection" in
order to have a right to the gains flowing from that wrongdoing.2 8
Weinrib's article clearly sets out his view that punishment can
properly include both deterrence and retribution, and that in either
case, corrective justice counsels that private law should have none of
it. Weinrib has no objection to the state pursuing social goals,
whether they are efficiency or retribution, but he thinks that it is a
mistake to confuse the penalties that might flow from the pursuit of
those goals with the remedies to which individuals have a right under
private law. 29 Thus, in contrast to others in this symposium who have
written with optimism -guarded

or otherwise-about the role that

punishment can play in determining damages in cases of unjust
enrichment and contract breach, Weinrib is quite pessimistic. If the
law continues in the direction identified by many of the authors in this
symposium, it will become "more flexible but less just."30
With Weinrib's caution in mind, it is worth considering Volker
Behr's article, Punitive Damages in American and German LawTendencies Towards Approximation of Apparently Irreconcilable

Concepts. This rich and far-ranging article covers many different
themes, but one which is most prominent is the story Behr tells of the
move by the German code of private law (the "Biirgerliches Gesetzbuch" or "BGB") towards incorporating noncompensatory damages
in a wide range of doctrinal areas.
The story Behr tells is one in which at the outset German tort
law bore the seeds of damages for "satisfaction" within doctrine of
pain and suffering. These damages were, on the one hand, noncompensatory, since they were measured against the character of the
defendant's wrong (his intent, usually) and not the damage caused to
the plaintiff by the defendant's act.31 They were compensatory to the
extent that they were given to the victim to compensate him for his
27. Id. at 73.
28. Id. at 74.
29. Id. at 100-01.
30. Id. at 103.
31. Volker Behr, Punitive Damages in American and German Law- Tendencies Towards
Approximation of Apparently Irreconcilable Concepts, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 105, 132-33
(2003).
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wounded honor.32 These damages developed since the 1960s as a way
to offer serious protection for violations of the right to personality.3 3
It is especially worth noting that the process described and denounced by Weinrib seems to have actually taken place in Germany
in recent years. Weinrib fears that loosening the tight connection
between the corrective justice content of private law right and its
remedy would open the door to the misuse of damages so they would
be shaped and measured by instrumental goals, such as deterrence.
As a descriptive matter, Germany seems to be following that path.
Behr describes how recent courts have elevated pain and suffering
damages in cases involving violations of the right to personality by the
media so as to achieve deterrence. 34 Under pressure from the European Court of Justice, the German law of employment discrimination
has been modified to allow for damages that would serve deterrence
more fully. 35 Finally, even the precise question of disgorgement,
which separates Weinrib and Kull, has been decided by the German
36
courts-in Kull's favor.
Behr's account is careful not to overstate the punitive elements
at work in the BGB. Nonetheless, he describes an area of law in
which both retributive and deterrent functions have been embraced
by the courts, at first covertly and then overtly. His view is that the
punitive elements already at work in the BGB are serving a variety of
important functions. There is really no point in asking whether it is a
good thing or not that the BGB has "imported" the idea of punishment in private law from the common law. The more pressing
question is when will the German courts and bar discuss the ways in
which Germany shares a variety of punitive devices with the common
law-thus making it easier for German courts to understand and
enforce the punitive awards which arise abroad (especially in America) which they are asked to enforce.3 7
The article I have written complicates the dichotomy between
punishment and compensation around which the other authors have
organized their analyses. The article criticizes the history used by the
Supreme Court to decide Cooper Industries,Inc. v. Leatherman Tool

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

133-34.
134-35.
136 (citing the 1994 decision known as Caroline I, BGHZ 128, 1).
142-47.
138-40.
156-61.
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Group, Inc. in 2001.38 I am not critical of the decision itself, which
held that appellate courts must perform de novo review of jury
awards of punitive damages under the Fourteenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution. The problem with the way the court
arrived at its decision is that it held that de novo review is permissible
because the ascertainment of how large a punitive damage award can
be is not a factual question. 39 What makes this statement so jarring is
not just that it takes jury determinations of punitive damages out
from under the Seventh Amendment, but that it is based on the
Court's assertion that at one point in history juries were finding facts
40
when they awarded punitive damages, but that time has passed.
I argue that the historical contrast upon which the Court based
its Seventh Amendment argument is not supported by the facts. The
history of punitive damages is far messier than the Court allows, and
far too messy to support its claim that somehow the function of
punitive damages has changed, which is why the Seventh Amendment
does not cover jury determinations of punitive damages, whereas
once it did.
Beyond the historical argument and the critique of how the
Court got to where it wanted to go in Cooper, I am making a broader
point: there never was, and there need not be now, a strict dichotomy
between punishment and compensation when it comes to tort damages. I illustrate that for many nineteenth-century legal scholars and
judges, punitive damages served a retributive function that went
beyond compensation for pain and suffering or promoting deterrence.
They served a very specific need to provide compensation for
wounded pride and injured honor. 41 Like the early German conception of "satisfaction" which formed the nucleus of punitive damages
in the BGB, early American tort law took seriously the idea that
"full" compensation sometimes required retribution on the part of
the victim of a tort against the defendant who violated his rights in
tort.
If American punitive damages were at one time capable of serving a compensatory function through retribution, then Weinrib's
corrective justice concerns about punishment in private law might

38. 121 S. Ct. 1678 (2001).
39. Anthony J. Sebok, What Did Punitive Damages Do? Why Misunderstanding the
History of Punitive DamagesMatters Today, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 163 (2003).
40. Id .at 175-78 (citing Cooper, 121 S. Ct. at 1686-87).
41. Id. at 186-88.
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need to be narrowed. It might be the case that, as Weinrib argues,
corrective justice cannot endorse remedies in private law that promote ends unconnected to the wrong suffered by the victim of the
violation of the private law right. But if punitive damages, for example, serve a compensatory function by punishing, then it might be the
case that punishment, to the extent that it serves a retributive function, is compatible with corrective justice. My description of punitive
damages in nineteenth-century America fills out what the possibility
might actually look like.
The last two articles anticipate and develop a problem that lurks
at the back of the choice between retribution and deterrence that
runs throughout the symposium. As Spencer Waller notes, even in an
area of law like antitrust, where by statute there is a private right of
action to pursue set damages, the punishment function does not
follow the structure set out by the remedy. Waller points out that for
a variety of reasons no one can say that the sanction for an antitrust
violation is treble damages, even though that is what the statute says. 42
The treble damages principle in private antitrust is, according to
Waller, incoherent at its core. 43 The rationale for treble damages has
variously been explained as promoting compensation and/or deterrence, although as Waller points out, there seems to be a retributivist
theme running throughout."
The incoherence in principle is exacerbated in its application.
The entry of many new enforcers on both the public and private side
of antitrust remedial action means that there is a complex and unstable dynamic of settlement and multiple penalties. In the wake of
litigation surrounding the Department of Justice's prosecution of
price fixing in the bulk vitamin industry, some defendants, such as
BASF, Hoffman-La Roche, and Rhone-Poulenc, paid damages for
public and private actions that may have totaled seven times their
gain.45 In other cases, antitrust violators who were more skillful in
their navigation of the various actions brought by state and private
actors could get away with paying much less then three times their

42. Spencer Weber Waller, The Incoherence of Punishment in Antitrust, 78 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 207, 210 (2003) (citing 15 USC § 15 (2000)).
43. Id. at211.
44. Id. at 211-13.
45. Id. at 225.
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gain. 6 Waller calls this wild and unpredictable variation in antitrust
47
damages "the punishment gap" in the treble damages principle.
The question of coherence and consistency in punishment is
something that cannot be ignored by anyone who purports to defend
punishment in private law. Waller's article on antirust damages in
private actions suggests that even where maintained by statute,
punishment in a system that depends on private actors initiating and
monitoring the calculation and collection of the penalty can result in a
wide scattering of remedies for the same act. Neal Feigenson takes
up the same question in his review essay, Can Tort Juries Punish
Competently? The article reviews Punitive Damages: How Juries
Decide, which was recently published by a distinguished group of law
48
professors and social scientists.
Sunstein and his coauthors used a series of experiments conducted with mock jurors to try to determine the factors that lead
jurors to make choices in verdicts about punitive damages. The
purpose of the research project was, as Reid Hastie describes in the
book's overview, to investigate three main questions. First, how do
jurors translate judgments about culpability into verdict dollar
amounts? Second, how well do jurors perform at deciding whether
certain conduct is culpable to the degree that would warrant punitive
damages under the law? And third, how good are jurors at understanding the sort of cost/benefit decisions that are required by defen49
dants in the real world?
Feigenson takes a close look at the methodology and preconceptions that went into each of the studies that make up the book's ten
empirically-oriented chapters. He gives its authors due respect for
having attempted an important and massively difficult research
project. But, Feigenson reminds us that the book's conclusion should
put us on guard about the assumptions that underpin it. The book
concludes, somewhat ruefully, that lay juries are not very good at
translating individual judgments of moral censure into verdicts that
are designed to punish. 50 If private law is to punish, how can it if the

46. Id. at 234-35 (discussing the Mylan settlement).
47. Id. at 233.
48. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, REID HASTIE, JOHN W. PAYNE, DAVID A. SCHKADE, & W. KIP
VISCUSI, PUNITIVE DAMAGES: How JURIES DECIDE (2002).

49. Id. at 22-25.
50. Neal R. Feigenson, Can Tort Juries Punish Competently?, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 239,
241-42 (2003).
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one tool needed to impose punitive remedies-the jury-is ill-suited
for the job?
Perhaps the problem with juries is not that they cannot do what
is asked of them but that the authors of Punitive Damages: How
Juries Decide are asking the wrong thing of juries. As Feigenson
points out, the inability of lay persons to correlate their moral intuitions with a four-paragraph, 300-word instruction based on the works
of Harvard Professors A. Mitchell Polinksy and Steven Shavell might
mean that juries are bad at awarding punitive damages. Or, it might
mean that juries reject the Polinsky-Shavell instructions as a useful
tool to determine appropriate civil penalties.5'
In his conclusion, Feigenson asks whether the lesson of Punitive
Damages: How Juries Decide is that juries do not think in terms of
optimal deterrence. 2 If that is correct, it is an insight that has importance for how we think about punishment in private law. If we
believe that the private law already does punish, as almost all the
authors in this symposium seem to believe, should it matter that it
seems that juries are especially bad at punishing in order to promote
efficient deterrence? Edlin and Schwartz may not care, since they
were discussing damages negotiated by the parties, not damages set
by jurors. But for all the other authors, the question is quite pressing.
Waller provides a picture of a world that already seems to have
accepted widespread incoherence at its core with regard to penalties
designed to deter and compensate-but it not clear that private law
theorists can look to the world of antitrust for their model.
III. NEW DIRECTIONS FOR INQUIRY

The articles in this symposium suggest that punishment is already
present in various parts of the private law in America, other common
law systems, and Germany. Even if one views these episodes of
punishment as too rare and limited to make a great difference in the
private law overall, it seems that one important lesson that comes out
of these articles is that in some ways the question of which punishment-retribution or deterrence-is as important as whether there is
punishment and what one thinks of it. This new question-what sort
of punishment ought there to be in private law-might form the basis
of a new direction of study.
51. Id. at 275-76.
52. Id. at 287.
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This symposium was initiated by the editors of the Chicago-Kent
Law Review, based upon the advice and recommendation of a
number of the faculty at that institution who believed that the topic
would reward patient and careful study. The results of their faith are
contained in the articles that follow. Many thanks to Michael
Shapiro, the editor-in-chief of the law review, Professors Richard
Wright and Steven Heyman of Chicago-Kent, and all of the authors
who chose to work on this project and who produced such excellent
articles.

